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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MYRA MARGIS, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BERT LIETZ, 
: Case No. 20010783-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION1 
1. Did the trial court err in striking her order dismissing the case? 
The question of whether the dismissal order was subject to correction as a clerical 
error presents a question of law, to be reviewed for correctness. C£, e.g., Lindsay v. 
Atkm, 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984). 
This issue was properly preserved by the Defendant's Reply to the Plaintiffs 
Response to the Defendant's Motion to quash Writ of Garnishment (R. 448-454). 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to set aside a default judgment against Lietz? 
1
 It appears that all issues were properly preserved below. 
In the event that they were not, Lietz claims that the Court should nonetheless 
address them under the plain error doctrine. The plain error doctrine requires a showing 
that an obvious and harmful error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial 
rights, although the obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error 
occurred which is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, 
e.g.. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); 
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 2001 UT 89 at ^ 145, 432 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 44. 
This issue is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion, bearing in mind that 
the law disfavors default judgments and that trial courts are to resolve doubts in this arena 
in favor of setting aside default judgments. See, e.g., Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 
(Utah 1986). 
This issue was properly preserved by the motion to set aside the judgment (R. 9-
132). 
CONTROLLING RULES, STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The following rules, statute, and constitutional provision are determinative of this 
appeal, and are in the addendum to this brief: United States Constitution, Amendment 
XIV, § 1; Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rules 4-501 and 4-504; Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 6., 55 and 60; Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. DISPOSITION 
Myra Margis named Bert Lietz in a civil complaint filed August 15, 1994, alleging 
the following causes of action: intentional and malicious interference with prospective 
economic relations, tortious interference with an economic enterprise, breach of contract, 
conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (R. 1-13). 
The factual gist of Margis' complaint was that Margis had borrowed $7,000 from 
Lietz, and had posted the contents of the Carousel Social Club as collateral, and that 
despite the fact that Margis honored her obligations under the promissory note, Lietz 
seized the contents of the club, and thereby foiled Margis' agreement to sell the Carousel 
Social Club to the owner of the Bombay House Restaurant (R. 1-13). 
2 
The complaint sought $17,200 in damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages, but 
the complaint was not verified or supported by any affidavit (R. 1-13). 
Counsel for Lietz mailed an answer admitting and denying the allegations in the 
complaint, and asserting as affirmative defenses that the complaint failed to state a cause 
of action upon which relief could be granted, estoppel, and waiver of claims (R. 20-28). 
On May 22, 1995, Judge Leslie A. Lewis set an order to show cause why the case 
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute (R. 29-30). 
On June 5, 1995, counsel for Margis wrote to Judge Lewis' clerk, informing her 
that the parties expected to settle the case or set it for trial shortly, and asking her to 
refrain from dismissing the case (R. 31). 
On August 8, 1995, counsel for Lietz appeared for a scheduling conference, but 
because no one appeared for Margis, Judge Lewis dismissed the matter without prejudice 
(R. 32). 
On November 1, 1995, counsel for Margis moved to set aside the dismissal, 
claiming a lack of notice of the scheduling conference on August 8, 1995, and on Januaiy 
30, 1996, Judge Lewis granted the motion and set aside the dismissal, ordering the parties 
to appear February 27, 1996 (R. 33-44; 45). 
Counsel for Margis appeared at the scheduling conference, but counsel for Lietz 
did not, and the court set a pre-trial date of June 14, 1996, and a trial date of July 8, 1996 
(R. 49). 
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At the pretrial conference on June 14, 1996, the trial court struck the trial date 
because the parties had reached a stipulation settling the case, and the trial court 
instructed counsel for Margis to prepare the order dismissing the case (R. 54; T. 
6/14/1996 at 3-9). The parties agreed that they would indemnify one another as long as 
Lietz returned certain property and paid Margis $750 within fourteen days (R. 6/14/1996 
at 3-9). 
At the healing, Ms. Margis expressed some concern about how satisfied she would 
be with Mr. Lietz's performance in returning the property, but she eventually agreed to be 
bound by the agreement (R. 6/14/1996 at 7). 
The court specifically recognized that at the time performance was to be rendered, 
counsel for Lietz, McPhee, would be out of town and would not be participating (R. 
6/14/1996 at 8). 
On July 23, 1996, Lietz filed a "Receipt and Indemnity Agreement" reflecting that 
he and a witness, Jarrel Jackson, had taken $750 and various items of property to Margis, 
but had left, because Margis and her lawyer had refused to sign the Receipt and 
Indemnity Agreement (R. 55). 
On November 9, 1997, Margis faxed a letter to the trial court, which letter was 
directed to her attorney, criticizing his performance, vilifying Lietz in general and in his 
failure to perform under the settlement agreement, and claiming that Margis never got her 
day in court (R. 56-57). 
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On January 5, 1998, Judge Lewis set the matter for a hearing on Margis' letter on 
April 30, 1998 (R. 58). 
On February 6, 1998, a representative for McPhee wrote to the court advising her 
that McPhee was on active duty with the military and would be unavailable until early 
July of 1998 (R. 64). 
On May 13, 1998, Judge Lewis set a scheduling conference for August 14, 1998, 
directing the attorneys to attempt to settle the case and directing the attorneys and both 
parties to be present (R. 66). The Notice of Pretrial/Scheduling Conference stated, 
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED. 
Date: 08/14/1998 
Time: 04:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor 0 N44 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
COUNSEL ARE TO HOLD MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT 
DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO THIS HEARING AND ARE TO BE 
PREPARED TO REPORT ON ISSUES RESOLVED AND ISSUES IN 
CONFLICT. IF THE CASE CANNOT BE SETTLED, A TRIAL DATE 
WILL BE SCHEDULED. 
THE COURT MAY IMPOSE OTHER SANCTIONS, SUCH AS AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO OPPOSING PARTIES, AS MAY SEEM 
JUST IN THE CASE. 
BOTH COUNSEL AND PARTIES WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE 
THE LAWSUIT MUST BE PRESENT. 
(R. 66). 
On July 31, 1998, counsel for Margis moved the court to enter findings of 
contempt for Lietz' failure to comply with the settlement agreement, and in the event of 
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Lietz's failure to appear at the scheduling conference and make meaningful settlement 
efforts, to strike the answer and to enter judgment in favor of Margis (R. 72-74). 
On July 31, 1998, counsel for Margis also filed a Notice of Intent and Attempts to 
Enter into Settlement Negotiations, indicating that counsel for Lietz, McPhee, had been 
re-assigned by the military, and would not be available until August 24, 1998 (R. 75-76). 
Thus, both opposing counsel and the trial court were notified that counsel for 
Lietz, McPhee, was out of state, would not be able to attend the August 14, 1998 hearing, 
and would not be able to appear until August 24, 1998 (R. 75-76). 
On August 14, 1998, Lietz and counsel did not appear, and Judge Lewis granted 
$980 in attorneys fees and travel costs to the plaintiff, and set the scheduling conference 
for August 21, 1998 (R.78-79). The minute entry for August 14, 1998 indicated that the 
Court would not preside over a trial or further hearing until Lietz paid the $980, and that 
if Lietz or his counsel did not appear on August 21, 1998, the court would strike Lietz's 
answer and enter judgment for the plaintiff (R. 79). The minute entry indicated that 
counsel for Margis was to send notice of the August 21, 1998 hearing by mail and fax (R. 
79). 
The notices from the trial court and counsel for Margis were both mailed to 
McPhee at his Salt Lake City office, despite the fact that counsel and the court were both 
on notice that McPhee was in Missouri on military orders at the time the notices were 
sent, as he would be on August 21, 1998 (R. 75-76). 
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On August 21, 1998, Lietz and counsel did not appear, and Judge Lewis granted 
Margis' motion to strike the answer, and granted judgment in favor of Margis in the 
amount of $67,200.00, plus attorney's fees (R. 88). 
The court made no findings to support the award of the damages, $50,000 of 
which were punitive damages, and all of which were sought in the unverified complaint, 
but not documented or justified by affidavit or in any other fashion (R. 88). 
The court specifically found that notice of the hearing went to counsel for Lietz, 
McPhee, from counsel for Margis and from the court (R. 88). Judge Lewis signed the 
judgment on August 28, 1998 (R. 89-90). 
On September 2, 1998, counsel for Lietz moved to set aside the default judgment 
under Utah R. Civ.P. 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(7), submitting a memorandum and affidavit 
explaining that counsel for Lietz had received no notice that Lietz's purported contempt 
would be heard at the August 14, 1998 or August 21, 1998 hearings, and was out of his 
office and out of state under military orders when the August hearings occurred (R. 95-
132). The documents explained that McPhee was unable to attend the hearing because he 
was under military order to be in Missouri at the time of the August 14, 1998 hearing, and 
was unable to participate in settlement negotiations at the time ordered by the court, by 
virtue of military orders prohibiting him from private practice of law during the relevant 
time (R. 95-132). McPhee's affidavit reflected his understanding with the secretary of 
counsel for Margis that the case was going to be rescheduled following August 24, 1998 
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(R. 125). 
On October 7, 1998, counsel for Lietz submitted the matter for decision (R. 133). 
On October 8, 1998, counsel for Margis filed a response to the motion to set aside 
the judgment and order of fees (R. 135-137). 
On October 15, 1998, counsel for Lietz moved to strike the response to the motion 
to set aside the judgment and fees, because the response was not timely filed, and was not 
filed late with leave of the court under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6 (R. 138-143). 
Margis wrote a letter to Judge Lewis filed October 15, 1998, vilifying Lietz and his 
counsel, and urging Judge Lewis to grant Margis relief (R. 145-147). 
On August 27, 1999, counsel for Margis filed a motion for order in supplemental 
proceedings, for Lietz to appear and account for and retain his property for satisfaction of 
the judgment (R. 148-152). 
On September 27, 1999, James C. Ziter entered an appearance on behalf of Lietz 
(R. 153). 
On September 27, 1999, Ziter requested a hearing on the Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees (R. 151). 
On September 28, 1999, Lietz was ordered to appear in supplemental proceedings 
to account for his property (R. 154-55). This order was apparently served on Lietz's wife 
at Lietz's address , but not on McPhee or Ziter (R. 155-157). 
On May 24, 2000, counsel for Margis moved for a hearing on Lietz's Motion to 
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Set Aside the Judgment (R. 158). 
On September 14, 2000, Lietz, acting pro se, moved to dismiss the action for a 
defective summons and failure to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a) and 4(c)(2) (R. 160-
171). 
On September 19, 2000, counsel for Margis moved the court again for 
Supplemental Proceedings requiring Lietz to appear and account for his properly (R. 
172). 
Counsel for Margis also filed a response to Lietz's motion to dismiss, arguing that 
the defense was waived by the general appearance and filing of an answer on August 23, 
1994 (R. 175-179). 
On September 21, 2000, James Ziter withdrew from representing Lietz (R. 181). 
On September 27, 2000, the court ordered Lietz to appear in supplemental 
proceedings on October 5, 2000 (R. 183-184). 
On September 28, 2000, counsel for Margis sent a notice to Lietz to file an 
appearance or to appoint counsel and notify counsel for Margis within twenty days (R. 
187-88). 
Lietz tendered with the district court clerk the $980 in attorney fees and travel 
costs ordered by Judge Lewis on August 14, 1998 as a precondition to holding any further 
hearings on the case (R. 193). 
On October 10, 2000, counsel for Lietz, McPhee, filed a second notice to submit 
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the Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorney's Fees (R. 189-193). 
On October 10, 2000, McPhee filed a Notice of Change of Address (R. 194). 
On October 12, 2000, counsel for Margis moved for Rule 11 sanctions for Lietz's 
pro se motion to dismiss (R. 196-198), and in response, Lietz withdrew his motion to 
dismiss (R. 199). 
On October 27, 2000, Judge Lewis entered a signed minute entry denying the 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees (R. 201). 
On December 4, 2000, both parties objected to proposed orders prepared by 
opposing counsel (R. 207-208; 209-210). 
On December 11, 2000, counsel for Lietz objected to the release of the funds held 
in trust by the district court for the attorneys fees and travel expenses ordered on August 
14, 1998 (R. 211-213). Lietz had tendered the $980 on October 5, 2000, because Judge 
Lewis had refused to hear the case until the $980 was paid (R. 79, 193). 
On December 18, 2000, over two years after the original notice to submit was filed 
(R. 133), Judge Lewis signed an order denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 
Award of Attorneys Fees (R. 214-215). Judge Lewis also entered an order that the $1,280 
held in trust by the district court be released to Margis (R. 223). 
On February 6, 2001, counsel for Lietz submitted a notice to submit Defendant's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Response, Defendant's Proposed Order Regarding the 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees, Plaintiffs 
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Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order Regarding Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees, Plaintiffs Motion for the Release of Funds, 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Order Regarding Defendant's Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorneys' Fees, and Defendant's Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for the Release of Funds (R. 227-243). 
These documents asked the court to set aside the prior orders of December 18 and 
19, 2001, and rule on pending matters (R. 236). 
On March 12, 2001, Lietz, acting pro se, filed a certificate of personal service of 
the order of dismissal dated June 16, 1996, and an affidavit of Daniel Shanthakumar 
contradicting allegations in Margis' original complaint that he had offered to buy the 
Carousel Club (R. 245-248). 
Lietz also prepared an order of dismissal with prejudice, reflecting the parties' 
original resolution of June 14, 1996, and Judge Lewis signed the order of dismissal with 
prejudice, effective June 14, 1996, on March 14, 2001 (R. 253-255). 
The order of dismissal signed by Judge Lewis is a detailed, three page ruling, 
referring to the transcript of June 14, 1996, which was attached (R. 253-255). 
Lietz also filed a Subpoena Duces Tecum ordering Margis' former landlord to 
provide documents concerning Margis' rental and eviction of the Carousel Club, "for 
court purposes only to determine if the defendant has committed perjury." (R. 269). It 
appears that the responsive documents are in the court file (R. 270-344). 
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On April 10, 2001, counsel for Margis filed obtained Writs of Garnishment, 
seeking to collect the judgment from First Security Bank, from America First Credit 
Union (R. 345-363). 
On July 5, 2001, counsel for Lietz moved the Court to quash and recall the writ of 
garnishment, based on the dismissal order signed March 14, 2001 (R. 363-371). 
Counsel for Margis moved to strike the order of dismissal as a clerical error, and 
sought a hearing (R. 372-430). 
On July 15, 2001, counsel for Margis field a Reply to Defendant's Motion to 
Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment (R. 431-442). 
On July 20, 2001, counsel for Lietz moved the court to enlarge the time in which 
to reply to the Plaintiffs Reply (R. 443-444). 
On August 3, 2001, counsel for Margis submitted the Motion to Strike Order and 
the Motion to Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment for decision (R. 445). 
On August 13, 2001, counsel for Lietz filed the Defendant's Reply to the 
Plaintiffs Response to the Defendant's Motion to quash Writ of Garnishment, arguing 
that the order of dismissal was a nunc pro tunc order, which correctly reflected the 
dismissal which occurred on June 14, 1996, and arguing that all court filings after June 
14, 1996, were legal nullities (R. 448-454). Counsel also moved to strike all of Margis's 
pleadings from October 10, 2000 to the present (R. 455-456). He submitted this for 
decision on August 16, 2001, along with the Motion to Quash and Recall Garnishment 
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and the Motion to Enlarge Time (R. 461-466). 
On August 22, 2001, Judge Lewis entered the "Court's Ruling," clarifying the 
order of December 18, 2000, and striking the order of dismissal on the theory that it was 
unclear that the parties ever reached an "accord and satisfaction" (R. 470). The court 
denied the Defendant's Motion to Quash and Recall the Writ of Garnishment (R. 471), 
and also indicated that the Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs Response to the Motion to Set 
Aside, Motion to Release Funds and Objection to the Plaintiffs proposed order were 
denied (R. 469-470). The court also denied the motion to strike the plaintiffs pleadings 
filed after October 10, 2000 (R. 471). 
Counsel for Lietz filed a timely notice of appeal on September 20, 2001 (R. 476). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Mr. Lietz was never allowed to try his case before the judgment entered, 
there are no additional facts in the record pertaining to this appeal, other than those stated 
in the Statement of the Case, supra. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in striking the order dismissing the case, which correctly 
stated the court's order dismissing the case on June 14, 1996. 
The court's ruling explaining the striking of the dismissal order reflects that the 
court viewed the entry of the dismissal order as a judicial, rather than clerical error. 
The dismissal order actually was not erroneous, but correctly reflected the trial 
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court's order to dismiss the case with prejudice, which was reached after the parties stated 
their stipulation for an out-of-court resolution of the case on the record. The order of 
dismissal should be treated as a valid nunc pro tunc order, and relate back to June 14, 
1996, rendering all subsequent inconsistent filings in this case nullities. 
The trial court erred in refusing to set aside the default judgment. Lietz timely 
moved to set it aside, has numerous meritorious defenses to the complaint, and his default 
falls within rule 60(b). 
As opposing counsel and the trial court were aware, during the August 14, 1998 
and August 21, 1998 hearings wherein the default was set up and entered, counsel for 
Lietz was unavailable because he was under military orders requiring him to be out of 
state and prohibiting him from participating until August 24, 1998. The record is 
unrefuted in demonstrating that counsel for Lietz spoke to the secretary of counsel for 
Margis in advance of the August hearings and obtained the assurance that the matter 
would be rescheduled when counsel was available, on or after August 24, 1998. 
Additionally, the August 14, 1998 hearing was designed to adjudicate Lietz's 
alleged contempt of the settlement, but no affidavit detailing his allegedly contemptuous 
conduct was ever filed. 
On these facts, the trial court's order denying Lietz his day in court and leaving 
him to pay a judgment near $70,000, including $50,000 in punitive damages, in the 
complete absence of any affidavits or other form of evidence to sustain the damages 
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awarded, reflects an abuse of discretion and requires reversal. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
STRIKING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL. 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
At the pretrial conference on June 14, 1996, the trial court struck the trial date 
because the parties had reached a stipulation settling the case, and the trial court 
instructed counsel for Margis to prepare the order dismissing the case (R. 54; T. 
6/14/1996 at 3-9). The parties agreed that they would indemnify one another as long as 
Lietz returned certain property and paid Margis $750 within fourteen days (R. 6/14/1996 
at 3-9). At the hearing, Ms. Margis expressed some concern about how satisfied she 
would be with Mr. Lietz's performance in returning the property, but she eventually 
agreed to be bound by the agreement (R. 6/14/1996 at 7). The court specifically 
recognized that at the time performance was to be rendered, counsel for Lietz, McPhee, 
would be out of town and would not be participating (R. 6/14/1996 at 8). 
On July 23, 1996, Lietz filed a "Receipt and Indemnity Agreement" reflecting that 
he and a witness, Jarrel Jackson, had taken $750 and various items of property to Margis, 
but had left, because Margis and her lawyer had refused to sign the Receipt and 
Indemnity Agreement (R. 55). 
On November 9, 1997, Margis faxed a letter to the trial court, which letter was 
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directed to her attorney, criticizing his performance, vilifying Lietz in general and in his 
failure to perform under the settlement agreement, and claiming that Margis never got her 
day in court (R. 56-57). 
On January 5, 1998, Judge Lewis set the matter for a hearing on Margis' letter on 
April 30, 1998 (R. 58). 
On February 6, 1998, a representative for McPhee wrote to the court advising her 
that McPhee was on active duty with the military and would be unavailable until early 
July of 1998 (R. 64). 
On May 13, 1998, Judge Lewis set a scheduling conference for August 14, 1998, 
directing the attorneys to attempt to settle the case and directing the attorneys and both 
parties to be present (R. 66). The Notice of Pretrial/Scheduling Conference stated, 
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED. 
Date: 08/14/1998 
Time: 04:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor 0 N44 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
COUNSEL ARE TO HOLD MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT 
DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO THIS HEARING AND ARE TO BE 
PREPARED TO REPORT ON ISSUES RESOLVED AND ISSUES IN 
CONFLICT. IF THE CASE CANNOT BE SETTLED, A TRIAL DATE 
WILL BE SCHEDULED. 
THE COURT MAY IMPOSE OTHER SANCTIONS, SUCH AS AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO OPPOSING PARTIES, AS MAY SEEM 
JUST IN THE CASE. 
BOTH COUNSEL AND PARTIES WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE 
THE LAWSUIT MUST BE PRESENT. 
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(R. 66). 
On July 31, 1998, counsel for Margis moved the court to enter findings of 
contempt for Lietz' failure to comply with the settlement agreement, and in the event of 
Lietz's failure to appear at the scheduling conference and make meaningful settlement 
efforts, to strike the answer and to enter judgment in favor of Margis (R. 72-74). On 
August 14, 1998, Lietz and counsel did not appear, and Judge Lewis granted $980 in 
attorneys fees and travel costs to the plaintiff, and set the scheduling conference for 
August 21, 1998 (R.78-79). The minute entry for August 14, 1998 indicates that if Lietz 
or his counsel did not appear on August 21, 1998, the court would strike Lietz's answer 
and enter judgment for the plaintiff (R. 79). 
On August 21, 1998, Lietz and counsel did not appear, and Judge Lewis granted 
Margis' motion to strike the answer, and granted judgment in favor of Margis in the 
amount of $67,200.00, plus attorney's fees (R. 88). The court specifically found that 
notice of the hearing went to counsel for Lietz, McPhee, from counsel for Margis and 
from the court (R. 88). Judge Lewis signed the judgment on August 28, 1998 (R. 89-90). 
On March 12, 2001, Lietz, acting pro se, filed a certificate of personal service of 
the order of dismissal dated June 16, 1996, and an affidavit of Daniel Shanthakumar 
contradicting allegations in Margis' original complaint that he had offered to buy the 
Carousel Club (R. 245-248). 
Lietz also prepared an order of dismissal, reflecting the parties' original resolution 
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of June 14, 1996, and Judge Lewis signed the order of dismissal with prejudice, effective 
June 14, 1996, on March 14, 2001 (R. 253-255). 
The order of dismissal signed by Judge Lewis is a detailed, three page ruling, 
referring to the transcript of June 14, 1996, which was attached (R. 253-255). 
Counsel for Margis moved to strike the order of dismissal as a clerical error, and 
sought a hearing (R. 372-430). 
On August 13, 2001, counsel for Lietz filed the Defendant's Reply to the 
Plaintiffs Response to the Defendant's Motion to quash Writ of Garnishment, arguing 
that the order of dismissal was a nunc pro tunc order, which correctly reflected the 
dismissal which occurred on June 14, 1996, and arguing that all court filings after June 
14, 1996, were legal nullities (R. 448-454). 
On August 22, 2001, Judge Lewis entered the "Court's Ruling," striking the order 
of dismissal, because it was unclear that the parties ever reached an "accord and 
satisfaction" (R. 470). The ruling states, in relevant part, 
It appears that this matter came before the Court for a pre-trial 
conference on June 14, 1996. According to the Minutes for this conference, 
the parties indicated to the Court that they had reached a stipulation. The 
stipulation was read into the record and the trial date was stricken. Counsel 
for the plaintiff was instructed to prepare the Order dismissing the case 
based on the stipulation. 
In response to a letter written to the court by the plaintiff, dated 
November 3, 1997, the Court scheduled a hearing for April 30, 1998. For 
unclear reasons, it does not appear that this hearing was ever held. Instead, 
because an Order of dismissal was never prepared, the Court scheduled a 
pretrial/scheduling conference for August 14, 1998. 
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On March 12, 2001, the Court received an Order of Dismissal that 
was filed by the defendant on a/?ro se basis. The Court entered this Order 
on March 14, 2001, because at first glance it appeared to reflect the reality 
that the parties reached an accord and satisfaction during the June 14, 1996, 
hearing before the Court. However, since the plaintiff filed her Motion to 
Strike Order, the Court has had an opportunity to further reflect on the 
propriety of this Order and whether it indeed conflicts with the events that 
transpired after the June 14, 1996, hearing and with the existing Judgment 
and Order already entered by the Court on August 28, 1998. The Court now 
determines that the Order of Dismissal does conflict with the prior 
Judgment and Order. In addition, it is not clear to the Court that the parties 
ever reached an accord and satisfaction because a formal Order dismissing 
the case based on the June 14, 1996, stipulation was never prepared and 
entered. Accordingly, the Court grants the plaintiffs Motion to Strike and 
vacates the Order of Dismissal entered on March 14, 2001. Furthermore, 
the defendant's Motion to Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment, which is 
based on the now-vacated Order of Dismissal, is also denied. 
(R. 467-47l)(Emphasis by the trial court). 
B. THE LAW 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) provides, 
(a) Clerical mistakes. 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after 
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, 
such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the 
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
Margis argued in the memorandum supporting the motion to strike the dismissal 
order that the court could strike the dismissal under this rule as a clerical error (R. 393-
400). 
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The dismissal order does not constitute a clerical error, however, because clerical 
errors occur when a trial court's judgment is improperly recorded, and are distinguished 
from judicial errors, which occur when trial courts make substantive errors See, e g , 
Lindsay v Atkui 680 P 2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984)2 As the court explamed there, 
The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error 
does not depend upon who made it Rather, it depends on 
whether it was made m rendermg the judgment or m 
recording the judgment as rendered 46 Am Jur 2d 
Judgments §§ 202 
Richards v Siddowav. 24 Utah 2d 314, 317, 471 P 2d 143, 145 (1970) 
(emphasis added) The correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be 
undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual mtention of the court and 
parties 6A Moore's Federal Practice para 60 60[l](2ded 1983) Rule 
60(a) is not mtended to correct errors of a substantial nature, particularly 
where the claim of error is unilateral The fact that an mtention was 
subsequenlly found to be mistaken would not cause the mistake to be 
"clerical" See Bershadv McDonough. 469 F 2d 1333 (7th Cir 1972) 
Lindsay at 402 
As the language of the trial court's ruling, quoted above, reflects, there was no 
clerical error m the entry of the dismissal order, which correctly reflected Judge Lewis' 
assessment when she signed it that the parties had settled the case (R 467-471) The 
order of dismissal signed by Judge Lewis is a detailed, three page rulmg, referring to the 
transcript of June 14, 1996, which was attached (R 253-255) 
2In Lindsay, the trial court granted a dismissal with prejudice to one party, and on 
appeal, the court rejected the argument that the error was correctable under 60(a), because 
while the judgment may have been substantively erroneous, there was no clerical erroi in 
its entry 
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Margis' alternative arguments in support of striking the dismissal order, that the 
judgment is void or reflects an oversight in the record, and was subject to being stricken 
under subsections (4) and (6) of Rule 60(b) are likewise without merit, because the order 
of dismissal order was not void or an oversight, but correctly stated the trial court's 
intention on June 14, 1996 to dismiss the case with prejudice. 
As was argued in the trial court (R. 448-454), the trial court's order was valid as a 
nunc pro tunc order. In Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984),3 the court 
recognized "[t]hat a nunc pro tunc order is not to make an order now for then, but to enter 
for then an order previously made." Id. at 299. Under this doctrine, "the court's act is 
effective earlier so that the record accurately reflects what happened, a nunc pro tunc 
order is used to make the record speak the truth." Furthermore, the purpose of a nunc pro 
tunc order is to reflect the content of a previous order. Id. see also Diehl Lumber 
Transportation Inc. v. Glen J. Mickelson d/b/a/ Glen's Service Company, 802 P.2d 739, 
742 (Utah App. 1990)("The function of a nunc pro tunc order is not to correct some 
affirmative action of the court which ought to have been taken, but its purpose is to 
correct the record which has been made, so that it will truly express the action taken but 
3In Preece, the court reversed a trial court's granting of a divorce nunc pro tunc to 
the date prior to the husband's death, because the decree was not final when the husband 
died. 
In Home v Home, 737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App. 1987), this Court recognized that 
since Preece, the legislature had enacted legislation granting trial courts broader 
discretion to enter orders nunc pro tunc in domestic relations cases. 
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which, through inadvertence or mistake was not truly recorded.").4 
In this case, the trial court's dismissal order was entirely consistent with her order 
of June 14, 1996, albeit that it was Mr. Lietz who prepared the dismissal order, rather than 
counsel for Margis. 
The transcript of the June 14, 1996 hearing reflects that the court ordered the case 
dismissed with prejudice, but that counsel for Margis failed to prepare the dismissal 
order, as required by Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
There is no evidence to marshal in support of the trial court's finding that the court 
was unsure that there was an "accord and satisfaction" reached by the parties, because the 
June 14, 1996 heairing transcript, in the Addendum to this brief, clearly states the terms of 
the agreement and reflects the agreement of both parties to be bound thereto. 
The trial court's use of the term "accord and satisfaction" was legally erroneous, 
because the dismissal order of June 14, 1996 and reflected in that transcript was based on 
a stipulation of the parties, and did not involve an accord and satisfaction, as that contract 
term is defined by law. Cf., e ^ , Pro Max Dev. Corp. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4 at f^ 21, 998 
P.2d 254, 259 ("'An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a contract agree 
that a different performance, to be made in substitution of the performance originally 
agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under the original agreement.' Golden 
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted). A party 
4In Diehl Lumber, this Court reversed a trial court's order permitting the filing of a 
third party complaint, because the order was not truly nunc pro tunc. 
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seeking to prove an accord and satisfaction must show (1) an unliquidated claim or a bona 
fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a payment offered as full settlement of the entire 
dispute; and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement of the dispute. See 
Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985)."). 
Because the order of dismissal correctly reflected the trial court's intention as of 
June 14, 1996, it is to have legal effect relating back to that date, and nullifies all 
subsequent and inconsistent orders. See Don Houston v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 
933 P.2d 403, 406-407 (Utah App. 1997) ("A nunc pro tunc order allows the court to 
enter an order which correctly reflects ruling previously made which, therefore, relates 
back to that previous ruling. See Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984); 
Bagshaw v. Bagshaw. 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990).").5 
It is clear in this case that the dismissal order was correct when it was entered, and 
should be read as controlling all events following June 14, 1996, rendering the subsequent 
pleadings and orders inconsistent therewith, particularly the judgments and orders against 
Lietz, legal nullities. See id. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The trial court originally ordered judgment in favor of Margis in an unsigned 
5In Dan Houston, the Court found that it had jurisdiction over an appeal filed in 
1993, based on a 1995 nunc pro tunc order correcting a technical deficiency in a 1993 
order. 
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minute entry on August 21, 1998, which stated, 
Based on the failure of Mr Mcphie [sic] to appear at this time, the Court 
grants Mr Pace's request to have the pleadings stricken. The court finds 
that notice went to Mr. Mcphie [sic] by the court and by Mr Pace. The 
judgment in the amount of $67,200.00 is granted with interest to accrue 
from the date of 8/21/98. Attorney fees are granted. Mr. Pace to submit 
affidavit with billing and order. 
(R. 88). The order signed by the court on August 28, 1998 states, 
The parties came before the Court on August 21, 1998 at the hour of 
4:00 pm for the scheduled pretrial conference. The Court had previously 
ordered that non appearance by the Defendant would result in his Answer 
being stricken and with default being entered against him in the amount 
plead in the Complaint. 
The Plaintiffs counsel was present and plaintiff was available by 
phone as ordered by the Court, Defendant was not present and noone [sic] 
appeared representing the Defendant. After reviewing the file, after finding 
that Defendant did not appear and noone appeared representing him, and for 
good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendant's Answer is stricken and Default is hereby entered 
against the Defendant. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered against the Defendant in the amount of 
$67,200.00 plus after accruing judgment rate of interest, costs and attorneys 
fees until paid. 
3. The judgment amount shall be increased be the plaintiffs 
reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $2,980.00, an amount supported 
by affidavat [sic] as to fees. 
(R. 89-90). 
Neither of these documents makes any specific finding to justify the award of 
$50,000 in punitive damages, or refers to any evidentiary basis for the damages awarded. 
The Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees, 
Supporting Memorandum, Affidavit of Jerold D. McPhee and other supporting 
24 
documents filed September 2, 1998, clearly establish that McPhee had no notice that 
Lietz's purported contempt would be heard at the August 14, 1998 or August 21, 1998 
hearings, that McPhee was unable to attend either hearing or participate in settlement 
negotiations prior to the hearings because he was out of state under military orders which 
prohibited him from practicing law until he was released from the orders, and that 
McPhee was told by the secretary of counsel for Margis prior to August 14, 1998, that the 
matter would be rescheduled to a time when McPhee became available, after August 24, 
1998 (R. 95-132). 
The Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was not properly opposed. The 
Plaintiffs untimely and objected-to Response to the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
and Award of Attorney Fees did not refute by affidavit or otherwise that McPhee had 
been told by the secretary of counsel for Margis that the matter would be rescheduled so 
that McPhee could be present and participate, but generally complained that McPhee 
should have made arrangements for someone to appear in court on his behalf, and argued 
that if the court set aside the judgment, parties could avoid their responsibilities to court 
by hiring attorneys who are out of the jurisdiction (R. 135-137).6 
6Counsel for Lietz moved to strike Margis' response to Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees, because the response was filed on October 
8, 1998, when it was due on September 12, 1998 under Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-501(l)(B), which provides, 
The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days 
after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and 
all supporting documentation. 
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The record is devoid of any explanation for the court's denial of the motion to set 
aside the default judgment, which denial was entered over two years after the original 
notice to submit was filed because Judge Lewis refused to proceed on the case until Lietz 
paid $980 in travel and attorney fees for the August 14, 1998 hearing, which his attorney 
could not attend because he was in service to the military (R. 79, 133). 
The minute entry dated October 27, 2000 states, 
A notice to submit has been filed, pursuant to rule 4-501, code of Judicial 
Administration, in connection with the defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees. The Court after having considered 
the motion and reviewing all the pleadings and the court's file, the Court 
denies the motion. The previous Order and Award of Fees remains in 
place. 
(R. 201). 
The court's order signed December 18, 2000, states, 
The Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of 
Attorney Fees came before this Court on the Defendant's second Notice to 
Submit on October 6, 2000. Defendant was represented by counsel Jerold 
McPhee, and the Plaintiff was represented by Nathan D. Pace, P.C. The 
Court after having considered the motion and reviewing all the pleadings 
and the Court's file, the Court denies the motion. The previous Order and 
Award of Fees remains in place. 
(R. 214). 
(R. 138-143). 
In her ruling dated August 22, 2001, Judge Lewis denied the Motion to Strike 
without explanation (R. 470). Inasmuch as the motion was clearly filed out of time under 
4-501(B), and because no motion was filed to justify the untimely filing under Utah 
R.Civ.P. 6(b), the trial court erred in denying the motion to strike. See id. 
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The Court's ruling, dated August 22, 2001, wherein the court clarified the 
December 18, 2000 order, does not explain the basis for denying the motion to set aside, 
but did indicate that the basis for the motion to set aside the judgment was that McPhee 
"had been on military duty during the time that the two hearings were scheduled and was 
unable to attend[,]" and did not recognize that the motion to set aside was also based on 
the fact that counsel did not receive notice that Lietz's purported contempt would be 
heard on August 14, 1998 or August 21, 1998, but was informed by the secretary of 
counsel for Margis that the matter would be rescheduled after August 24, 1998, so that 
McPhee could be present and participate (R. 468). 
B. THE LAW 
1. Assessment of Damages without Evidence 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of default judgments. It states, 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. 
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief 
is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided 
by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall 
enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. 
After the entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give 
such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken 
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these 
rules to be served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the 
event that it is necessary for the court to conduct a hearing 
with regard to the amount of damages of the nondefaulting 
party. 
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(b) Judgment. 
Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. 
When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for a sum 
certain or for a sum which can by computation be made 
certain, and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside 
of this state, the clerk upon request of the plaintiff shall enter 
judgment for the amount due and costs against the defendant, 
if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not 
an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. 
In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default 
shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the 
court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect it is necessary 
to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or 
to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make 
an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct 
such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary 
and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. 
For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in 
accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. 
The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment 
by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a 
cross-claini or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to 
the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. 
No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against 
an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or 
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
(Emphasis added) 
As this Court explained in Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768 
P 2d 950 (Utah App. 1989), 
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The procedure for assessing damages after the entry of a default judgment is 
governed by Rule 55(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant 
to Rule 55, when a plaintiffs claim is for other than a sum certain or an 
amount that by computation can be made certain, judgment must be entered 
by the court and "if, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages . . . . the court may conduct such hearings or order such 
references as it deems necessary and proper. " Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) 
(emphasis added). 
Id. at 962. 
In the instant matter, prior to awarding any specific damages, at a minimum, Judge 
Lewis should have held an evidentiary hearing. See id. As the court directed in Skanchy 
v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1998), 
A clerk of the court may enter a default judgment if a defendant 
defaults and if the complaint seeks damages for a "sum certain or for a sum 
which can by computation be made certain." Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b). 
However, if the damages claimed are unliquidated, a default judgment can 
be entered only by a judge. See Russell v. Marteli 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 
(Utah 1984). To enter a default judgment for unliquidated damages, a judge 
must review the complaint, determine whether the allegations state a valid 
claim for relief, and award damages in an amount that is supported by some 
valid evidence. In other words, the allegations in the complaint are not a 
sufficient basis for awarding unliquidated damages. See Larsen v. Collina, 
684 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1984). That usually means a hearing must be held so 
that the plaintiff can provide evidentiary support for the award of damages. 
Skanchy at 1076. 
While a default judgment reflects that the defaulting party is liable for each cause 
of action stated in the complaint, it is still the burden of the prevailing party to justify the 
amount of damages claimed by competent evidence. See, e.g.. Arnica Mutual Insurance 
Company v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah App. 1989). 
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While it is possible for parties to sustain their evidentiary burden in seeking 
damages with appropriate affidavits detailing the "nature and extent of damages 
incurred," e.g., Schettler, 768 P.2d at 963, no such affidavits were filed in this case. 
In assessing the amount of punitive damages to award, trial courts are to consider 
seven factors: 
(1) the relative wealth of the defendant, (2) the nature of the alleged 
misconduct, (3) the facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct, 
(4) the effect thereof upon the lives of the plaintiff and others, (5) the 
probability of future recurrence of the misconduct, (6) the relationship 
between the parties, and (7) the amount of actual damages awarded. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d at 967. 
In the instant matter, there was no evidentiary hearing on damages, and there were 
no affidavits filed in support of the damages sought in the unverified complaint. The 
record does not reflect that the trial court considered the necessary factors in awarding 
$50,000 in punitive damages, nor could she have, because the relevant and necessary 
evidence was never before the court. Cf., Security Adjustment Bureau v. West, 437 P.2d 
214, 216 (Utah 1968)(Ellett, J., concurring)(trial court could not award punitive damages 
without taking evidence). 
Because the damage award in this case was never properly sustained by evidence, 
at a minimum, this Court should remand the matter for the consideration of evidence on 
the issue of damages. See Russell v. Martell 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984)(court 
reversed damage award, because the damages due were not "sums certain," and thus the 
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trial court needed to hold an evidentiary hearing to assess the damages). Cf, e.g., 
Schettler, supra, 768 P.2d at 964-68 (Court remanded for recomputation of general and 
punitive damages). 
2. Failure to Set Aside Default 
Judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in 
the interest of justice and fair play. No one has an inalienable or 
constitutional right to a judgment by default without a hearing on the merits. 
The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a 
full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case. 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962). 
The rule governing withdrawal of default judgments, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
60 provides, 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) 
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
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or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Trial courts are normally granted discretion in ruling on motions to set aside 
default judgments under Rule 60(b), but the law disfavors default judgments and trial 
courts are to resolve doubts in this arena in favor of setting aside default judgments. See, 
e.g., Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). Unless there is proof that setting aside 
a default judgment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, any reasonable excuse 
justifies setting aside default judgments. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Supply 
Company v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).7 As the Larsen court explained in 
reversing an order of dismissal, 
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the business of the court with 
efficiency and expedition the trial court should have a reasonable latitude of 
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a party fails to move 
forward according to the rules and the directions of the court, without 
justifiable excuse. But that prerogative falls short of unreasonable and 
arbitrary action which will result in injustice. Whether there is such 
justifiable excuse is to be determined by considering more factors than 
merely the length of time since the suit was filed. Some consideration 
should be given to the conduct of both parties, and to the opportunity each 
has had to move the case forward and what they have done about it; and 
also what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other side; 
and most important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal. 
Id. at 878-879 (footnotes omitted). 
7In Larsen, the court reversed the trial court's order dismissing a case for delays 
caused by the plamtiff s extended efforts to comply with the discovery request. See id. at 
879. 
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By reviewing the record in the instant case in light of the appropriate factors, it is 
clear that the trial court abused her discretion in refusing to set aside the default 
judgment. The record demonstrates that the case was once dismissed for Margis' failure 
to prosecute (R. 32), and is completely uncontradicted in indicating that the reasons that 
Lietz did not appear for the August hearings were that his counsel was under military 
orders that prohibited his attendance and participation at that time, and was told by the 
secretary of Margis' attorney that the matter would be rescheduled when McPhee became 
available on August 24, 1998 (R. 95-132). 
Particularly where Ms. Margis previously agreed to settle the matter despite her 
reservations, and then backed out (R. 6/14/1996 at 7; R. 55-57), and where there has 
never been a claim that Margis would be prejudiced by setting aside the default judgment, 
leaving Mr. Lietz to pay a $70,000 judgment without ever having had a trial or fair notice 
of the impending default constitutes an abuse of discretion. As the Larsen court 
concluded, 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and to move 
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is even 
more important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence of 
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice 
between them. In conformity with that principle the courts generally tend to 
favor granting relief from default judgments where there is any reasonable 
excuse, unless it will result in substantial prejudice or injustice to the 
adverse party. 
Id. at 879. 
This Court has required a party seeking relief from a default judgment to make a 
tripartite showing: that he timely moved for relief in the trial court, that he has a 
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mentonous defense, and that the default was caused by a reason listed in Rule 60(b) See 
Black's Title Inc v Utah State Ins Dept 1999 UT App 330,1} 6, 991 P 2d 607, 610 
In this case, the motion to set aside the judgment was timely Once the trial court 
entered the default on August 28, 1998 (R 89-90), counsel timely moved to set it aside on 
September 2, 1998 (R 95-132) 
Mr Lietz has numerous meritorious defenses to the complamt, as reflected in his 
demals and the affirmative defenses in his answer (R 20-28) In his answer, Lietz demed 
most material allegations, including those pertaining to the terms of the promissory note, 
Margis' performance of her obligations under the promissory note, his alleged conversion 
of Carousel Social Club assets and the assets of its customers, his alleged breach of 
contract, the impending sale of the club to the Bombay House Restaurant, his mtent to 
cause emotional distress, and the damages caused by his actions (R 20-28) Additionally, 
the court file contains an affidavit from the owner of the Bombay House Restaurant, 
specifically denying the allegations m the complamt that he was gomg to purchase the 
Carousel Social Club from Ms Margis (R 245-248) 
The reason for the default falls clearly within rule 60(b) Under subsection (1), a 
court may set aside a ruling for "mistake, inadvertence, surpnse, or excusable neglect" 
Because the trial court was notified m July that McPhee was under military orders 
and unable to participate until August 24, 1998, the schedulmg of the August 14 and 
August 21 hearings should be viewed as mistake or inadvertence on the court's part, 
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which surprised McPhee, who had made arrangements with the secretary of counsel for 
Margis to set the hearing when McPhee was able to attend and participate (R. 75-76, 95-
132). See id. 
Alternatively, counsel's and Lietz's failure to appear are fairly characterized as 
excusable neglect. As the Court recognized in Black's Title, to show excusable neglect 
under the rule, a party must show that he "'used due diligence and that he was prevented 
from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.'" Id. at [^10, 991 P.2d at 
611. 
Here, counsel for Lietz was under military orders from the U.S. Government which 
prevented him from being present or participating in the August hearings, and made 
arrangements with the secretary of counsel for Margis to reschedule the matter until he 
was available, three days after the hearing occurred (R. 95-132). The record reflects that 
opposing counsel and the trial court were notified prior to the final hearing that McPhee 
could not attend until August 24, for on July 31, 1998, counsel for Margis also filed a 
Notice of Intent and Attempts to Enter into Settlement Negotiations, indicating that 
counsel for Lietz, McPhee, had been re-assigned by the military, and would not be 
available until August 24, 1998 (R. 75-76). Compare Black's Title, supra ("Here, Black 
merely asserted that he was under a doctor's care and unable to work. He neither 
described the illness, nor explained how it wholly prevented him from taking the steps 
required to maintain contact with counsel, Black's Title, or the Department. In the absence 
of such a showing, Black's assertion does not demonstrate his neglect was excusable."). 
Assuming arguendo, but not conceding, that counsel for Lietz was at fault for 
obeying the military orders from the United States government which prevented his 
presence in Judge Lewis's court, the trial court should not have punished Lietz for any 
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shortcoming on the part of counsel. This is verified by reference to McKean v. Mountain 
View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d 129 (Utah 1966), in which the trial court granted a 
default judgment against the defendants after their attorney appeared twenty-seven 
minutes late for trial, because the attorney had been trying to obtain a writ of prohibition 
from the Utah Supreme Court to halt the trial, because his witnesses were unavailable. 
See id- at 129-130. In reversing the default judgment, the supreme court explained, 
The object to be desired in this as in all cases is the searching out of the 
truth and doing justice between the parties in regard to the controversy between 
them. To Cctrry out that purpose it is the policy of the law to favor a trial on 
the merits and to afford both sides a full opportunity to present their evidence 
and contentions as to disputed issues so they may be disposed of on substantial 
rather than upon technical grounds. Accordingly courts should exercise 
caution in regard to default judgments and should be somewhat indulgent in 
setting them aside. In order to achieve the objectives just stated it 
is sometimes necessary to look beyond what may appear to be ill-advised, 
or even irritating or contemptuous conduct of counsel to the adjudication of 
the rights of the parties to the action. It should be kept in mind that their 
rights and amy such misconduct of counsel are separate and distinct things which 
should be dealt with separately. 
The purpose of a default judgment is to conclude litigation when a defendant 
fails to plead or otherwise defend an action. In such circumstances its use 
is practical and salutary. However, it was never intended to 
be used as a means of disciplining attorneys who may be derelict in the 
performance of their duties. If such a course were followed it may do a grave 
mjustice to the client by punishing him rather than the attorney who has done 
the wrong. 
Id. at 130-31 (footnotes omitted). 
Likewise here, if Judge Lewis had a desire to discipline counsel, McPhee, she 
should have proceeded accordingly, but had no business entering a default judgment 
against Lietz. See id. 
Subsection (7) of Rule 60(b) permits relief from judgment "for any other reason 
justifying relief . . ." 
One other reason justifying relief in this case is that Margis sought the August 14, 
hearings to adjudicate Lietz's being in contempt of the settlement agreement (R. 72-74) 
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While the motion for the hearing and Ms. Margis's letters in the court file cast numerous 
aspersions on Mr. Lietz, there was never any affidavit filed to detail his allegedly 
contemptuous actions. In a case of indirect contempt, or contempt allegedly occurring 
outside the presence of the court, an affidavit is required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3, 
which states, 
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence 
of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which 
an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate 
view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby 
guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as prescribed in Section 78-
32-10 hereof. When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view 
and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be 
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a 
statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other judicial officers. 
As the courts have recognized, the contempt affidavit lacking in this case is an 
element of due process, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, necessary to inform the court and person accused of contempt of the 
allegedly contemptuous conduct to be adjudicated. See, e.g.. Khan v. Khan, 921 P.2d 
466, 468 (Utah App. 1996).8 Because Lietz thus did not obtain proper notice and due 
process, this is a further basis for relief from the judgment flowing from that hearing 
under 60(b)(7). 
Because Lietz timely moved for relief from judgment, has meritorious defenses to 
8
 In Khan, this Court reversed a finding of indirect contempt for violation of 
a child visitation order, finding that Mr. Khan had received constitutionally inadequate 
notice. Id. at 470. 
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present, has justified the default under rule 60(b), and would be grossly prejudiced by the 
denial of his day in court, this Court should reverse the trial courts' orders denying his 
motion to set aside the default judgment. See Black's Title; Larsen, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should rule that the trial court erred in striking the dismissal order, and 
recognize the order as a valid nunc pro tunc order, which nullifies all subsequent 
inconsistent filings in this case. 
At a minimum, the Court should hold that the trial court abused her discretion in 
failing to set aside the default judgment, reverse the order refusing to set aside the default 
judgment and all related Qfjiers, and remand this case to the trial court for trial. 
Dated this \ ^ day of. 
Certificate of Mailing/Delivery 
I, Jerold D. McPhee, counsel for Mr. Lietz , hereby certify that I have caused to be 
hand-delivered/inailed, first-class postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing document to Nathan D. Pace and David Pace, 136 South Main, #404, Salt Lake 
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City, Utah 84101 / " day of 
Counsel forMFTLietz 
Mailed/delivered accordingly this ^ day of A{C^ ,2002. 
i 7 
T ^ /1H 
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Rulings of the Trial Court 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA MARGIS, 
vs . 
BERT LIETZ, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
Case No: 940905177 CV 
Judge: LESLIE LEWIS 
Date: August 14, 1998 
Clerk: chells 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): MYRA MARGIS 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): NATHAN D. PACE 
Video 
HEARING 
Based on the failure to appear of the defendant and his counsel, 
the Court grants attorney fees in the amount of $480'. 00, further 
the plaintiff is awarded travel costs in the amount of $500.00. 
The defendant is to pay the amounts before the case will 
proceed to trial or hearing. 
At the next hearing the plaintiff may appear by telephone. 
The court orders failure to appear by the defendant or an attorney 
for the defendant (Mr McPhie or partners) will result in the 
defendant pleadings being stricken and a judgment will enter for 
the plaintiff. The next hearing is set for 8/21/98 at 4:00 pm 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to send notice by mail and by fax to 
Mr McPhie. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA MARGIS, 
vs. 
BERT LIETZ, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
INCOURT NOTE 
Case No: 940905177 CV 
Judge: LESLIE LEWIS 
Date: August 21, 1998 
Clerk: chells 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): NATHAN D. PACE 
Video 
Based on the failure of Mr Mcphie to appear at this time, the Court 
grants Mr Pace's request to have the pleadings stricken. The Court 
finds that notice went to Mr Mcphie by the court and Mr Pace. The 
judgment in the amount of $67,200.00 is granted 
with interest to accrue from the date of 8/21/98. Attorney fees 
are granted. Mr Pace to submit affidavit with billing and order. 
Page 1 (last) 
*MAG£$ 
NATHAN D. PACE, (6626) 
136 SOUTH, MAIN STREET SUITE 404 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-9700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ED DISTRICT COURT 
hird Judicial District 
AUG 2 8 1333 
SALT Ulffi COUNTY ^ 
Deputy Clerk 
ENTERED IN RSGPTRY 
Or JUDGMENTS 
PATE / E p l ^ i f — 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA MARGIS, 
BERT LIETZ, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940905177CV 
Judge: Leslie Lewis 
The parties came before the Court on August 21, 1998 at the hour of 4:00pm for the 
scheduled pretrial conference. The Court had previously ordered that non appearance by the 
Defendant would result in his Answer being stricken and with default being entered against him 
in the amount plead in the Complaint. 
The Plaintiffs counsel was present and plaintiff was available by phone as ordered by the 
Court, Defendant was not present and noone appeared representing Defendant. After reviewing 
the file, after finding mat Defendant did not appear and noone appeared representing him, and for 
good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1 
1. Defendant 's Answer is stricken and Default is hereby entered against the 
Defendant. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered against the Defendant in the amount of $67,200.00 plus 
after accruing judgment rate of interest, costs, and attorneys fees until paid. 
3. The Judgment amount shall be increased be the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees 
in the amount of $2,980.00, anlaftiount supported by affidivat as to fees. 
DATED THIS r ^ ' d a y ofv_ ( / •' -\i 1998. 
' BY THE COURT: 
( 
- <v * - -
L- Judge Leslie Lewis 
District Court Judge 
2 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA MARGIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERT LIETZ, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY RE: MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE 
Case No: 940905177 
Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Date: 10/27/2000 
Clerk: chells 
A notice to submit has been filed, pursuant to rule 4-501, code of 
Judicial Administration, in connection with the defendant's Motion 
to Set Aside Judgemnt and Award of Attorneys Fees. The Court after 
having considered the motion and reviewing all the pleadings and 
the court's file, the Court denies the motion. The previous 
and Award of Fees remains in place. 
fudge LESLIE A. LEWIS 
s • 
/ 
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NATHAN D. PACE, P.C. (6626) 
DAVIDS. PACE (8252) 
136 SOUTH MAIN STREET. SUITE 404 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-9700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
By-
FILED DISTRICT COURt " 
Third Judicial District 
DEC f$2OQ0 ..._ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
n>' 17*, o\) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA MARG1S, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BERTLIETZ, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 940905177 CV 
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
The Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees came before 
this Court on the Defendant's second Notice to Submit on October 6,2000. Defendant was 
represented by counsel Jerold McPhee, and the Plaintiff was represented by Nathan D. Pace, P>C, 
The Court after having considered the motion and reviewing all the pleadings and the Court"s file, 
the Court denies the motion. The previous Order and Award of Fees remains in place. 
y^ n 
MADE AND ENTERED this / >^ day of &Mc*^. 2000. 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Third District Court 
W ' d S£:SI 0002-^,0-03(1 r>iU 
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BERT LIETZ 
4901 SOUTH LAURA DRIVE 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
(801) 268-1436 
feputy Cl* fH 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
MYRAMARGIS, 
PLAINTIFF, 
V. 
BERT LIETZ, 
DEFENDANT. 
} 
} CASE NUMBER: 940905177CV 
} 
} JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
} 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
This matter came before the court on 14 June 1996; her counsel, Nathan Pace 
represented the plaintiff, while his attorney, Jerold McPhee, represented the defendant. 
The parties reached an accord and satisfaction relating to this matter and agreed to this 
action being dismissed. The following facts are provided for the court: 
On 14 June 1996 the parties reached an accord and satisfaction, as follows: 
"Mr. Lietz will return to Myra Margis all bingo equipment 
taken from the Carousel Club, as well as any other 
personal property of any - - either Mrs. Margis or any of 
the people who were there, the patrons of the carousel. 
Mr. Lietz will make no claim on the automobiles that 
secure Mr. Margis' debt to him. Both parties sign the 
mutual release of all claims against the either party and 
there will be the mutual restraining order in effect between 
the parties." 
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The court questioned the parties relating to the above accord and satisfaction, both 
parties acknowledged their acceptance. The court then accepted the accord and 
satisfaction and order Mr. Pace to prepare the paperwork for dismissal. A copy of the 
transcript is incorporated and marked Exhibit "A." Also provided is a copy of the money 
order, which is incorporated and marked as Exhibit "B." A statement relating to the 
return of the property was previously filed with the court. 
Therefore, the defendant has complied with the accord and has satisfied the matter 
and the matter was thusly dismissed. 
Plaintiffs attorney was ordered during this hearing to prepare and submit the 
necessary paperwork to dismiss this action, he failed to. This was a willful and deliberate 
violation on Mr. Pace's part, because the court clearly ordered him to do it and the rules 
of judicial Administration, Rule 4-504 requires it. His failure is a clear contempt of the 
court's order and will be made an issue separately on an order to show cause. The 
following is the courts own words: 
I will allow you, then, Mr. Pace, to prepare the documents 
concerning dismissal. 
Mr. Pace the acknowledge the courts order by stating, "That's fine." 
The defendant has taken it upon himself to prepare the paperwork and is 
submitting it for signature. 
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Order of Dismissal 
Civil Number: 940905177CV 
Plaintiff: Myra Margis 
Defendant: Bert Lietz 
Therefore, the court after reviewing the defendant's dismissal and a full review of 
transcript and other documents provided, and the court record and upon good cause 
appearing the court orders the following: 
It is hereby adjudged, decreed, and ordered that: 
1. The parties did reach an accord and satisfaction in this matter. Furthermore, 
the court, in open court and on the record, accepted the accord and satisfaction as 
represented and accepted by both parties. 
2. Once the court accepted the settlement agreement the court ordered the case to 
be dismissed and order the plaintiffs attorney to prepare the documents for its dismissal 
Clearly from the record the plaintiffs attorney failed to comply with this courts order. 
3. The effective date of dismissal is 14 June 1996. 
Therefore, this action is dismissed with prejudice effective 14 June 1996. 
Dated this // day of March 2001 
"OF THE COURT: 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
Leslie A. Lewis , -
A, 
S * J 
^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA MARGIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERT LIETZ, 
Defendant. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
: 
: 
: 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 940905177 
The Court has before it several Notices to Submit, filed 
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
in connection with defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's 
Pleading from 10 October 2000 through Present, defendant's Motion 
to Quash and Recall Garnishment and Motion to Enlarge Time and the 
plaintiff's Motion to Strike Order. The Court has carefully 
considered each of these Motions and has also thoroughly reviewed 
the file in this matter. 
It appears that this matter came before the Court for a pre-
trial conference on June 14, 1996. According to the Minutes for 
this conference, the parties indicated to the Court that they had 
reached a stipulation. The stipulation was read into the record 
and the trial date was stricken. Counsel for the plaintiff was 
instructed to prepare the Order dismissing the case based on the 
stipulation. 
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In response to a letter written to the Court by the plaintiff, 
dated November 3, 1997, the Court scheduled a hearing for April 30, 
1998. For unclear reasons, it does not appear that this hearing 
was ever held. Instead, because an Order of dismissal was never 
prepared, the Court scheduled a pretrial/scheduling conference for 
August 14, 1998. The Minutes for the August 14, 1998, hearing, 
indicate that the defendant and his counsel, Mr. McPhie, failed to 
appear. The Court granted the plaintiff attorney's fees and 
travel costs, totaling $980. The hearing was then re-scheduled 
for August 21, 1998, with a warning from the Court that if Mr. 
McPhie or one of his associates failed to appear again, the 
defendant's pleading would be stricken and judgment entered against 
him. 
On August 21, 1998, Mr. McPhie again failed to appear and the 
Court granted the plaintiff's request to strike the defendant's 
Answer and enter judgment in her favor. The judgment amount 
granted was $67,200, together with interest to accrue from the date 
of the hearing. Attorney's fees were also granted. The Order and 
Judgment was entered on August 28, 1998. 
On September 2, 1998, the defendant filed a Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and Attorney's Fees. The basis for this Motion was 
that Mr. McPhie had been on military duty during the time that the 
two hearings were scheduled and was unable to attend. From the 
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point that the defendant filed this Motion to Set Aside, the record 
becomes more confusing because the file contains motions filed on 
behalf of the defendant by Mr. McPhie, by a Mr. Ziter (who entered 
an appearance of counsel on September 28, 1999) and by the 
defendant himself on a pro se basis. It appears that Mr. Ziter 
eventually withdrew as defendant's counsel and was replaced by the 
defendant's original attorney, Mr. McPhie. However, throughout the 
time of his representation by both counsel, the defendant was also 
submitting his own motions and pleadings, including a Motion to 
Dismiss and the Order of Dismissal, discussed below. 
On December 18, 2000, the Court considered the defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and denied it. An Order denying the 
Motion was entered contemporaneously. 
On February 6, 2001, the defendant filed a second Motion and 
Memorandum to Set Aside Order and Rule on Outstanding Motions. 
This Motion essentially asks the Court to clarify the record by 
ruling on the defendant's Motion to Strike (the plaintiff's 
response to the original Motion to Set Aside as untimely), Motion 
to Release Funds and defendant's Objection to the plaintiff's 
proposed Order. It should have been clear to the defendant when 
the Court entered the plaintiff's proposed Order on December 18, 
2000, that the defendant's Motion to Strike, Motion to Release and 
Objection were also being denied. However, to clarify the record, 
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the Court now rules that although it was not expressly stated, the 
Motion to Strike, Motion to Release and Objection were indeed 
denied upon the Court's entry of the December 18, 2000, Order. 
On March 12, 2001, the Court received an Order of Dismissal 
that was filed by the defendant on a pro se basis. The Court 
entered this Order on March 14, 2001, because at first glance it 
appeared to reflect the reality that the parties reached an accord 
and satisfaction during the June 14, 1996, hearing before the 
Court. However, since the plaintiff filed her Motion to Strike 
Order, the Court has had an opportunity to further reflect on the 
propriety of this Order and whether it indeed conflicts with the 
events that transpired after the June 14, 1996, hearing and with 
the existing Judgment and Order already entered by the Court on 
August 28, 1998. The Court now determines that the Order of 
Dismissal does conflict with the prior Judgment and Order. In 
addition, it is not clear to the Court that the parties ever 
reached an accord and satisfaction because a formal Order 
dismissing the case based on the June 14, 1996, stipulation was 
never prepared and entered. Accordingly, the Court grants the 
plaintiff's Motion to Strike and vacates the Order of Dismissal 
entered on March 14. 2001. Furthermore, the defendant's Motion to 
%% 
MARGIS V. LIETZ PAGE 5 COURT'S RULING 
Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment, which is based on the now-
vacated Order of Dismissal, is also denied.1 
Finally, the Court considers the defendant's Motion to Strike 
Plaintiff's Pleadings from 10 October 2000. While the plaintiff 
has apparently mailed certain of her pleadings to an incorrect 
address for the defendant, striking the plaintiff's pleadings is 
too harsh a remedy, particularly where it does not appear that the 
defendant has been prejudiced by this mistake. Plaintiff is to 
ensure that she corrects her mailing address for the defendant for 
all future filings. The defendant's Motion to Strike is denied. 
In future if the defendant is represented by counsel, any 
motions should be filed by counsel. 
This Court's Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this 12-
•WJ 
i. day of August, 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
1 MM v 
1
 To clarify the record, in light of the Court's decision to vacate the Order 
the defendant's Motion to Quash and related Motion to Enlarge Time are moot. However, in the 
interest of justice, the Court granted the Motion to Enlarge and considered the defendant's late-
filed Reply to the plaintiffs Response to the Defendant's Motion to Quash. 
Transcript of June 14, 1996 
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S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h ; J u n e 1 4 , 1 9 9 6 ; P . M . 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We're on the record in the 
matter of Myra Margis -- did I mispronounce it? 
MR. PACE: No. 
THE COURT: -- versus Bert Lietz. I'll 
indicate it's case number 940905177. 
Mr. Pace is here with the plaintiff, the 
defendant is also present with counsel Mr. McPhee, 
and this matter was set for pre-trial. Counsel has 
visited respectively with the Court and their client 
and it's my understanding --
And I will ask you to reflect this for the 
record, as plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Pace, that there 
has been a resolution. Is that correct? 
MR. PACE: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Will you state, for the record, 
what your understanding of the resolution is. 
MR. PACE: Mr. Lietz will return to Myra 
Margis all the bingo equipment taken from the 
Carousel Club, as well as any other personal property 
of any -- either Mrs. Margis or any of the people who 
were there, the patrons of the Carousel. Mr. Lietz 
will pay to Mrs. Margis the sum of $750. Mr. Lietz 
will make no claim on the automobiles that secure 
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Mrs. Margis' debt to him. Both parties will sign the 
mutual release of all claims against either party, 
and there will be the mutual restraining order in 
effect between the parties. Both parties shall have 
no contact, harassings, or any contact with the other 
party except through their legal counsel. And I 
believe that's it. 
MR. MCPHEE: In addition -- one additional 
and one correction. 
With respect to personal property that 
Mr. Lietz has or may have in his possession, if 
Mr. Lietz has personal property in his possession he 
will return that or make it available, any of the 
personal property he has, other than the bingo 
equipment, bingo machines, flash boards, microphones, 
and miscellaneous supplies. 
Moreover, your Honor, payment and 
delivery -- rather, delivery of the equipment at a 
time convenient to plaintiff, and certainly within 14 
days, and payment of the $750 within like period of 
t ime . 
THE COURT: Mr. Pace, your client appears 
to have a concern. Is there anything else that needs 
to be clarified? 
MR. PACE: Yeah. There were a number of 
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patrons of the Carousel Club that left a personal 
amount of personal belonging there, and those 
belongings were gone when Mr. Lietz got in back with 
the equipment. 
THE COURT: What sorts of items are we 
talking about? 
THE PLAINTIFF: People leave personal items 
on the table. There was stuff for sale on 
consignment that belongs to other people. I'm asking 
for something -- jackets, bingo bags full of bumpers 
and trinkets that they use for the bingo game, and 
also\the kitchen equipment and --
THE COURT: All right. So, to the extent 
that those items exist, they are to be returned 
within the 14-day period of time. To the extent that 
they are not provided, I think the plaintiff is 
clearly entitled to an explanation, through counsel, 
of what occurred to those items. And I don't know 
that we can do better than that. If they're in 
existence and in the defendant's possession they are 
to be restored. 
You're going to have your hands full, 
Mr. Lietz, not from Mrs. Margis, but from the other 
individuals, if they're not returned. These items 
being -- don't, please don't point. 
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What I would ask is that you give some 
thought to this matter and, as Mr. McPhee pointed 
out, you have a restoration period of 14 days, and 
what is required is you are to turn over everything 
that is encompassed in the agreement. 
All right. Does that satisfy your client's 
concerns, Mr. Pace? 
MR. PACE: I believe so. 
MR. MCPHEE: Your Honor, if I may indicate, 
Mr. Lietz handed me a receipt, indemnity agreement 
executed by a Millie Hunt, stating that she had 
asserted a claim and is taking possession of two 
cupcake pans, two big pots, and one cookie sheet that 
would be -- I assume that is one of the individuals 
who assert a claim against personal items that 
Mr. Lietz may have had. 
THE COURT: To the extent that items have 
been restored, obviously, Mrs. Margis is not going to 
contend that they haven't been restored. I 
understand that she's attempting to make sure people 
who have claims to property that would have been on 
the premises, have that restored to them. Obviously, 
if somebody has gotten back their items, then, that's 
something that she is not going to pursue, or the 
others are not going to pursue. 
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Now, Mrs. Margis, is this your 
understanding of the agreement? Do you agree to be 
bound by it? And I am referring to everything 
Mr. Pace has said with the modification suggested by 
Mr. McPhee. 
THE PLAINTIFF: I'm not getting back the 
stuff he took, I guess, but --
THE COURT: I have no way of knowing that, 
but you have excellent representation and what you 
need to do is decide whether or not you want to go to 
trial on this and pay attorney's fees, and see what 
happens at the end of the trial, or whether you want 
to accept it. No one is forcing you to accept it. 
It's up to you, but if you accept it you will be 
bound by it. And I suspect that if you don't accept 
it, this $750 and restoration of property will not be 
on the table the next time. So that's up to you. Do 
you need time to think about it? Or is this your 
agreement and do you agree to be bound by it? 
THE PLAINTIFF: I guess I'm willing to try. 
THE COURT: Is this your agreement? 
THE PLAINTIFF: Yes. 
THE COURT: And do you agree to be bound by 
it? 
THE PLAINTIFF: Yes. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Lietz, is this your 
agreement and do you agree to be bound by it? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: I will allow you, then, 
Mr. Pace, to prepare the documents concerning 
dismissal . 
MR. PACE: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Thank you to both of you. 
MR. MCPHEE: If I may, again, with benefit 
of the record, I will be out of town between the 16th 
and 28th. This will be due on the 28th. I have no 
problem with Mr. Pace contacting Mr. Lietz directly 
or Mr. Lietz contacting Mr. Pace directly to arrange 
for payment and delivery. 
THE COURT: Now, a clear understanding, 
Mr. Lietz, that you may contact Mr. Pace pursuant to 
what Mr. McPhee has represented, but you are not, 
under any circumstances, to contact the plaintiff 
directly. All right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is there anything further at 
this time? 
MR. PACE: No 
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THE COURT: That takes care of it. Thank 
you. The best of luck everybody. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: Let me indicate for the record 
that Mr. McPhee has represented he has no problem 
with Mr. Pace tendering the order without 
Mr. McPhee's written approval as to form and content. 
And I know Mr. Pace to be -- both counsel to be 
excellent attorneys with high ethical standard, and 
so we will rely on that representation and Mr. Pace's 
professionalism in that regard. 
MR. PACE: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. MCPHEE: Thank you, your Honor. May we 
be excused? 
THE COURT: Yes. Good to see all of you. 
(Proceedings in the 
above - entitled matter were 
concluded.) 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 4-501 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except 
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This 
rule does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of 
extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. 
All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be 
accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities 
appropriate affidavits, and copies oi or citations by page 
number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other 
documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda 
supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in 
length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as 
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the 
court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is 
made to file an over-length memorandum, the application 
shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the 
memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall 
include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five 
pages. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties 
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. If 
the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition 
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to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the 
court for decision as provided in paragraph (1)(D) of this rule. 
(C) Reply memorandum. 
The moving party may serve and file a reply memorandum 
within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. 
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file a reply 
memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice 
to Submit for Decision." The Notice to Submit for Decision 
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date 
the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date 
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a 
hearing has been requested. The notification shall contain a 
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither party files a 
notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(A) Memorandum m support of a motion. 
The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those 
portions of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. 
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of 
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists 
followed by a concise statement of material facts which 
support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically 
refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing 
party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to 
the record shall be deemea admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a 
hearing unless ordered by the court, or requested by the 
parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(B) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of 
the action or any claim in the action on the merits with 
prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal 
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may 
file a written request for a hearing. 
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(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that 
(a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) 
that the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the 
granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively 
decided. 
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall 
notify the requesting party. When a request for hearing is 
granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the 
requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the 
requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and 
notify all parties of the date and time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy 
of the motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all 
documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be 
delivered to the judge hearmg the matter at least two working 
days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly 
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of 
the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk 
of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the 
parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the 
motion shall be deemed waived. 
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) 
days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions 
shall be heard after that date without leave of the court. 
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party 
fails to file a memorandum in opposition, the moving party 
may withdraw the request or the court on its own motion may 
strike the request and decide the motion without oral 
argument. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. 
Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court 
may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the 
provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the 
motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be 
resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. 
The court on its own motion or at a party's request may direct 
arguments of any motion by telephone conference witnout 
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all 
telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by 
counsel. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, 
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law 
with respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements. 
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Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small 
claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature 
unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to 
the court and counsel within five days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement 
and dismissal. 
(4) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner as 
to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in uie cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order 
or decree is made. 
(5) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall 
contain, if known, the judgment debtor's address or last known address and 
social security number. 
(6) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of 
the documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is 
based. 
(7) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed 
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation 
was made on the record. 
(8) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay 
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written 
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new 
complaint a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written 
obligation. 
(9) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court, 
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other 
agreement which has not been reduced to writing. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6 
(a) Computation. 
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the 
local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable 
statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated 
period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period 
so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which 
is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional time provided 
under subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays 
and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. 
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court 
an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the 
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without 
motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before 
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a 
previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified 
period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of 
excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action 
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent 
and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. 
The period of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any 
proceeding is not affected or limited by the continued existence or 
expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a 
term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act or take 
any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before it. 
(d) For motions — Affidavits. 
A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice 
of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time 
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specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules, by 
CJA 4-501, or by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be 
made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the 
affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided 
in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before 
the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. 
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some 
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other 
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days 
shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under 
subsection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in 
the computation of any 3-day period under this subsection, except that if the 
last day of the 3-day period is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the 
period shall run until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, 
Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. 
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact 
is made to appear the clerk shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. 
After the entry of the default of any party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) 
of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice 
of action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice or paper otherwise 
required by these rules to be served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is 
necessary for the court to conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment. 
Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. 
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When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, and the defendant has been 
personally served otherwise than by publication or by personal service 
outside of this state, the clerk upon request of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against the defendant, if he has been 
defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not an infant or incompetent 
person. 
(2) By the court. 
In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or 
to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such 
hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. 
For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in 
accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. 
The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment 
by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a 
cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to 
the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. 
No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against 
an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or 
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 
(a) Clerical mistakes. 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after 
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, 
such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the 
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
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(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) 
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3 
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence 
of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which 
an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate 
view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby 
guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as prescribed in Section 78-
32-10 hereof. When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view 
and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be 
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a 
statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other judicial officers. 
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